Divided Law Enforcement and the Public Stand: The Interplay of Role-Based Image Discrepancies and Ideologies

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Acknowledgements: I am indebted to Caroline Bartel, Janet Dukerich, and Dave Harrison for really helpful feedback on previous versions of this manuscript. I am also very grateful to all the law enforcement officers reported here for their participation in my studies, to the administrative personnel at the agencies for their support, and to the body camera footage raters for their valuable expertise and insights. Finally, I thank Lydia Mitzi Gross and Max Jordan Williams for their research assistance. This paper was presented at the Organization Science Winter Conference 2017 and supported by the McCombs Research Excellence Grant.
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Abstract

Previous research assumes that employees who perceive that the public underestimates the difficulties of their jobs (“PPU”) are likely to exhibit poorer performance. Integrating theories on role-based image discrepancies and motivated information processing, I challenge this assumption by proposing that employees’ political ideologies play a critical role in differentially shaping (a) how employees respond to image discrepancies, and (b) the likelihood that these image discrepancies are experienced in the first place. Using independent expert ratings of 794 body camera videos of 164 police officers across two agencies, Study 1 shows that PPU decreases performance for officers who more strongly support liberal criminal justice policies but not for officers who more strongly support conservative policies. Study 2 replicates this interaction using supervisor ratings of 82 officers across four agencies. In a time-lagged survey of 184 officers, Study 3 further demonstrates that stronger conservative beliefs bolster PPU. Taken together, these studies provide novel insights into how image discrepancies and ideologies interact to reinforce perceived divides between employees and the public: those who are shielded from the harmful effects of PPU are the same ones who experience PPU. Implications for theory on image discrepancies and for public policy are discussed.
“An average person cannot comprehend the risks and has no true understanding of a cop’s job. Hollywood and television stereotypes of the police are cartoons in which fearless super cops singlehandedly defeat dozens of thugs, shooting guns out of their hands. Real life is different. An average cop is always concerned with his or her safety and tries to control every encounter [...] For you, this might be a ‘simple’ traffic stop, for me each traffic stop is a potentially dangerous encounter” (Dutta, 2014).

This quote by a Los Angeles police officer reflects a belief that the public underestimates the difficulties and challenges of his job. Such a belief is considered to be a role-based image discrepancy, or perceived misalignment in how employees see their work roles and how they think others see them (Vough et al., 2013). In recent times, law enforcement officers have become particularly prone to perceiving that the public underestimates the difficulties of their jobs (“PPU”), e.g., a Pew Research Center study of 8,000 U.S. police officers found that a staggering 86% believe that the public does not understand the risks and challenges they face (Morin et al., 2017). But, PPU is by no means unique to law enforcement officers. Indeed, in their groundbreaking qualitative study, Vough and colleagues found that these perceived image misalignments also arise among architects, accountants, lawyers, and registered nurses. In all these occupations, law enforcement included, employees not only provide critical services for the public but their effectiveness on the job is also contingent on meeting the public’s expectations. That is, across these occupations, in as much as the public depends on employees for their expertise, employees also depend on the public for their support and validation (Kadushin, 1962; Ojasalo, 2001). Failure to receive public support, as we have witnessed in the heavily-publicized cases in which police officers have been accused of misconduct, can be costly for employees and their organizations.

Research has shown that, in these occupations in which failing to meet the public’s expectations is highly consequential, PPU can negatively impact employee performance in powerful ways (Vough et al., 2013). Scholars argue that this occurs because perceived misalignment between how employees see themselves and how they think others see them creates a “crisis” (Swann, 1987). In other words, employees interpret the discrepant feedback from the public as counternormative—i.e., they believe that observers should not be seeing them in ways that are discrepant with their own perceptions. As a result, this violation of how things should be erodes their sense of predictability and controllability in the interaction (Mead, 1934; Goffman, 1959; Burke and Reitzes, 1981), generating uncertainty about how they should interact with these observers in order to meet their expectations (Swann and Read, 1981; Swann, Stein-Seroussi, and Giesler, 1992; North and Swann, 2009). For
example, a lawyer worries that, due to clients’ misunderstandings of the legal profession, “They [the clients] will think, ‘Well my lawyer must not be doing a good job for me because otherwise the other side would be knocking at my door…it must be my lawyer’s fault’” (Vough et al., 2013: 1063). When members of the public have the power to impose harsh penalties on employees, this uncertainty can be quite detrimental for employee effectiveness because of the stress and anxiety it causes. This potential to trigger uncertainty and anxiety is one of the reasons why scholars studying not just PPU, but also image discrepancies in general, have typically associated image misalignments with poorer individual effectiveness (e.g., Swann, Milton, and Polzer, 2000; Polzer, Milton, and Swann, 2002; Steele, Spencer, and Aronson, 2002; Roberts, 2005; Cable and Kay, 2012).

However, drawing on motivated information processing theory, I challenge this assumption that PPU constitutes an uncertainty-inducing “crisis” for all employees. Motivated information processing theory posits that people’s worldviews and assumptions shape how they interpret and react to their social worlds (Nickerson, 1998; Kunda, 1999). This in turn suggests that employees’ worldviews may differentially affect how they interpret and react to PPU. One meaningful way to capture employee worldviews is through their political ideologies. Lying on a continuum ranging from liberal on the left to conservative on the right (Feather, 1979; Schwartz, 1996; Jost, 2006), political ideologies refer to individuals’ core beliefs about how social roles should be structured (Knight, 2006; Tetlock et al., 2013; Briscoe and Joshi, 2016). As the employee-public relationship constitutes a social role, political ideologies are highly relevant to understanding varying attitudes that employees have about the “manner and degree of interaction which ought to hold” between the two parties (Kadushin, 1962: 519). Given that belief systems shape people’s processing of their environments (Kunda, 1999), political ideologies should thus “possess motivational structure and potency” (Jost and Amodio, 2012: 56) in explaining the different ways in which employees cope with public misunderstandings.

Integrating theories on image discrepancies and motivated information processing, this article examines the interplay of PPU and political ideologies by proposing that these belief systems shape (a) how PPU affects employee performance, and (b) the likelihood that employees experience PPU in the first place. Specifically, I hypothesize that PPU would have a negative effect on performance because of the uncertainty that it induces, but this relationship would be stronger for employees who are more liberal. Their beliefs in minimizing the social
distance in the employee-public relationship motivates them to interpret PPU as a state that should not exist; therefore, their notion of social order is threatened. However, the negative link between PPU and performance should be weaker for those who are more conservative. Their beliefs in maintaining social distance motivate them to interpret PPU as normative, i.e., the way things should be. Thus, more conservative employees are unlikely to face the same uncertainty or threat to their sense of social order under PPU. Furthermore, although conservative ideologies are likely to shield employees from the negative effects of PPU, I also hypothesize that these same ideologies bolster the experience of PPU. In other words, conservative ideologies may play a double-edged sword: while they prevent PPU from negatively affecting employee performance, they may motivate employees to continue to experience these image discrepancies.

I tested this interplay of PPU and ideologies across three studies in a high-stakes, high-profile context: law enforcement. Because of the mutual interdependence between police officers and the public, law enforcement exemplifies a context in which perceived misunderstandings of employees’ roles greatly matter. Police officers are granted certain legal authorities over the public to protect their safety, but given the impact that they can have on human life, failure to meet the public’s expectations as a result of misunderstandings can result in damaging outcomes ranging from temporary suspension to imprisonment. Furthermore, as recent events have shown, failure to meet the public’s expectations can have broader sociopolitical impacts by inciting social movements (e.g., Black Lives Matter), spawning political debate (as witnessed in the 2016 presidential election), and prompting public policy overhauls (e.g., The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing). Across the three studies, police officers’ political ideologies were reflected in their relative support for varying criminal justice policies (Carroll et al., 1987; Carlsmitb and Darley, 2008; Wenzel et al., 2008). Study 1 consists of independent expert ratings of 794 body camera videos of 164 officers across two agencies; Study 2, supervisor ratings of 82 officers across four agencies; and Study 3, a time-lagged survey of 184 officers at an agency.

Taken together, these studies have important theoretical and practical implications. First, they suggest that there is a much more complex link between image discrepancies and performance than previously acknowledged. That is, there are systematic differences in how employees respond to public image misalignments; not all employees experience performance decrements because, contrary to what previous research assumes, not everyone’s sense of order and predictability is necessarily threatened by image
discrepancies (or the inability to “self-verify”) (cf., Swann, Stein-Seroussi, and Giesler, 1992; Polzer, Milton, and Swann, 2002). Second, and relatedly, these studies are the first to suggest that we cannot understand the effects of image misalignments on performance without accounting for employees’ normative assumptions about the employee-public relationship. Some individuals simply view public image discrepancies as the way things should be, whereas others do not, and these different worldviews drive how they react to image discrepancies (cf., Vough et al., 2013). Interestingly, it is the employees who fundamentally believe in reducing divides between themselves and the public who suffer the negative consequences of PPU (although they are less likely to experience PPU in the first place). Third, these studies break ground by drawing attention to the self-reinforcing nature of image discrepancies over time: the ideologies that shield employees from the negative effects of image discrepancies are the same ones that bolster these discrepancies. This finding is not only theoretically important in that it expands our knowledge of image discrepancies by teasing apart an individual-difference antecedent of these perceptions, but it also has important public policy implications. Of note, it sheds light on the underlying dynamics that sustain “us” versus “them” divides between employees and the public—a potentially disadvantageous phenomenon especially for public safety organizations whose mission is to serve and protect.

**Perceived Public Underestimation of Employees’ Jobs and Performance**

Image discrepancies broadly refer to misalignments in how people see themselves and how they think others see them, and are thus subjective or perceptual experiences as opposed to objective ones (Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail, 1994; Roberts, 2005; Meister, Jehn, and Thatcher, 2014). *Role-based* image discrepancies are a specific type of image discrepancy, which fittingly refer to perceived misalignments in how employees see their roles and how they think the public sees them. When an employee perceives that the public underestimates the complexities and challenges of their roles (PPU), he or she is experiencing a type of role-based image discrepancy (Vough et al., 2013). Examples of PPU abound across a variety of occupations in which the public is a critical constituency. For instance, studies have shown that some public school teachers believe that the “public underestimates the amount of knowledge and practice that it takes to become an accomplished teacher” (Boser, 2017). Additionally, some police officers believe that the “public underestimates
the threats to their life” (D.K., 2015). And some firefighters believe that one of the ugly truths that the public will never understand are the tragic tradeoffs they make—“the constant mental playback, wondering if only they were a little bit faster, a little bit better, a little more poised, a little more heroic” (Morse, 2016).

Role-based image discrepancies like PPU are distinct from other types of image discrepancies, such as character-based and organization-based discrepancies. Whereas role-based image discrepancies concern perceived misalignments in what employees do and the content of their work, character-based image discrepancies concern who someone is (i.e., the traits associated with the social groups to which they belong, Spencer, Steele, and Quinn, 1999). For example, a surgeon who believes that patients do not understand the tough decisions she confronts in the operating room is experiencing a role-based image discrepancy; but, when she believes that patients think she is low in warmth, she is experiencing a character-based image discrepancy. Compared to role-based image discrepancies, character-based discrepancies have received far more attention in both social psychology (e.g., Swann, Stein-Seroussi, and Giesler, 1992; Steele, Spencer, and Aronson, 2002) and organizational behavior (e.g., Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999; Polzer, Milton, and Swann, 2002; Roberts, 2005). So too have organization-based discrepancies, which concern misalignments in how employees see their organization and how they think outsiders see it (Dutton, Dukerich, and Harquail, 1994). For instance, Dutton and Dukerich (1991) describe how employees of the Port Authority station of New York and New Jersey believed that the presence of homeless individuals created a negative public image of the station as dirty and dangerous, which was inconsistent with how they perceived their organization.

The lack of attention to role-based image discrepancies like PPU is unfortunate given that initial work suggests that such image discrepancies, although seemingly innocuous, can negatively impact employee performance in powerful ways (Vough et al., 2013). This negative impact on performance is particularly evident in occupations in which the public can impose large penalties on employees for failing to meet their expectations. In such occupations, PPU is believed to function in similar ways to other image discrepancies: it induces performance-debilitating levels of uncertainty (Swann and Read, 1981; Polzer, Milton, and Swann, 2002; North and Swann, 2009). That is, when the public is seen as underestimating the nuances of the job, employees come to believe that the public is imposing unrealistic expectations on them because they do not understand the challenges and complexities of the job (Vough et al., 2013). Oftentimes, these impractical
expectations have to do with the quickness and ease with which employees can get the work done. For example, a lawyer states, “I think that everyone thinks that in a week or two we will go over to the courthouse and they can just tell their story to the judge […] even then they don’t quite believe it that a lot of time things can take years and there is the discovery process” (Vough et al., 2013: 1063). Other times, the impractical expectations have to do with the level of control that employees have over the public’s well-being. For instance, a physician writes, “Our culture has come to view death as a medical failure rather than life’s natural conclusion. These unrealistic expectations often begin with an overestimation of modern medicine’s power to prolong life, a misconception fueled by the dramatic increase in the American life span over the past century” (Bowron, 2012). Either way, managing these expectations can induce much uncertainty and stress because they are, for one, impractical in that the realities of employees’ jobs prevent them from successfully meeting them, and employees have to manage these expectations without losing legitimacy in the public’s eyes (Vough et al., 2013). Because of the negative consequences of failing to meet expectations, this uncertainty can be so overwhelming that it ultimately reduces “the chances that people will achieve the goals that brought them to the interaction (Polzer, Milton, and Swann, 2002: 299).

Based on the grounded theorizing by Vough and colleagues, I formally advance the hypothesis that PPU negatively impacts employee performance. Law enforcement officers who believe that the public underestimates their job should experience the same uncertainty and stress, which ultimately detracts from their performance. Similar to lawyers, accountants, architects, and registered nurses (the employees interviewed by Vough et al. (2013)), law enforcement officers are subject to public scrutiny and the threat of accusations of misconduct. Thus, law enforcement officers who experience PPU are likely to also experience performance-debilitating uncertainty and stress about how to meet the expectations of a constituency that simultaneously misunderstands their job and yields power over them. For instance, in the wake of a series of police shootings that sparked riots across the U.S., an officer commented on the misaligned expectations of the public: “The public have unrealistic expectations of what [we] do […] police officers cannot be expected to deal with social problems, like mental illness or drug addiction, without resorting to force” (D.K., 2015). These unrealistic expectations are likely to
create uncertainty about how officers should respond to and interact with the public in ways that would be deemed appropriate, and this uncertainty can, in turn, preclude employees from being effective in their jobs.

**Hypothesis 1.** Officers who perceive that the public underestimates the difficulties of their jobs (“PPU”) are likely to exhibit lower job performance.

**The Moderating Role of Employee Ideologies**

However, motivated information processing theory also suggests that people’s desires and worldviews can differentially affect how they interpret and react to the same phenomenon, in this case PPU (Heath, Larrick, and Klayman, 1998; Nickerson, 1998). Political ideologies offer an influential way of organizing people’s worldviews and values (Feather, 1979; Schwartz, 1996; Jost et al., 2003b), as they define people’s “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (Erikson and Tedin, 2003: 64). Political belief systems are considered to be a relatively stable trait that, because of their genetic and physiological correlates (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, 2005; Westen, 2007; Oxley et al., 2008), can be detected as early as nursery school (Block and Block, 2006). As political ideologies capture people’s normative beliefs about how roles and relationships should be structured, management scholars have found that these ideologies can affect a number of relational ties in organizations, including managers’ relationships with their employees (Tetlock, 2000; Tetlock et al., 2013), CEOs’ relationships with stakeholders (Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino, 2013) and their top management teams (Chin and Semadeni, 2017), and board of directors’ relationships with CEOs (Gupta and Wowak, 2016). Furthermore, it should be noted that although socialization processes can shape employee ideologies (Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick, 2016), individuals within the same organization can still vary in their personal ideologies (Christensen et al., 2015).

At a broad level, scholars have argued that political ideologies fall on a continuum that ranges from liberalism to conservatism (Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009), and are manifested in different ways with regard to specific domains (Duckitt et al., 2002). For example, with regard to economic issues, political ideologies can range from beliefs in regulated markets that curb exploitation, to beliefs in unregulated, or free, markets that naturally produce fair processes and outcomes (Jost et al., 2003a). Additionally, with regard to social issues, political ideologies can range from advocacy of social equality and the protection of minorities, to support for goals such as equity that may come at the cost of social equality (Harrison et al., 2006; Tetlock et al., 2013).
Similarly, political ideologies can manifest in different ways in the domain of criminal justice. Here, people differ in their beliefs about how the relationship between representatives of the justice system, such as law enforcement officers, and society’s transgressors should best be structured (Hogarth, 1971; Carroll et al., 1987). Specifically, these ideologies range from beliefs in restorative justice to beliefs in retributive justice, and reflect people’s responses to two interrelated questions: “When a transgression has occurred, how should society take action?” and “How can society best deter future transgressions” (Wenzel et al., 2008)?

Individuals who side more with restorative, as opposed to retributive, justice believe in repairing the harm caused by the transgressor rather than punishing the transgressor. More simply, they believe more strongly in restoring peace through open dialogue and negotiations (Okimoto and Wenzel, 2009). From their perspective, relying on punishment alone disrupts communities and undermines future harmony (Okimoto, Wenzel, and Feather, 2009). In lieu of simply punishing, people who are more supportive of restorative justice aim for long-term gain by seeking to determine and rectify with the transgressor and the broader community the underlying causes of the transgressor’s actions (Mead, 1917; Wenzel et al., 2010). By contrast, individuals who are more supportive of retributive, as opposed to restorative, justice emphasize punishment, or “just deserts,” as an effective means to correcting past wrongs and deterring future bad behaviors (Feather, 1999; Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson, 2002; Darley, 2002). In contrast to restorative justice, retributive justice implicitly assigns individual responsibility for offenders’ actions, and thereby stakes an adversarial relationship between representatives of the criminal justice system and offenders (Tyler and Weber, 1982). That is, stronger supporters of the retributive method of justice see the offender as an “enemy,” which “brings with it the attitudes of retribution, repression, and exclusion” (Mead, 1917: 227).

Motivated information processing theory suggests that by capturing people’s beliefs about their roles with the public, these criminal justice ideologies can shape how employees interpret and respond to PPU, and consequently, how it affects their performance. Specifically, I hypothesize that the negative relationship between PPU and performance should be weaker among those with more liberal justice ideologies but stronger among those with more conservative ideologies. This moderating effect is possible because employees’ justice ideologies are likely to differentially affect the degree to which employees interpret and experience PPU as
uncertainty-inducing. Those with stronger beliefs in restorative justice should be more susceptible to experiencing uncertainty under PPU than those with stronger beliefs in retributive justice for at least two reasons.

For one, officers who more strongly support restorative justice believe that their roles should be interdependent with the public—i.e., they should share a common identity with the public because one of the goals of restoration is to seek validation of shared values (Wenzel et al., 2010). As such, officers with these more liberal justice ideologies are likely to interpret PPU as a violation of how the employee-public relationship should be; in their minds, these discrepancies with the public should not exist. This clash with their conception of how things should be may exacerbate the sense of uncertainty and unpredictability that these officers experience when interacting with a public that misunderstands their jobs, thereby debilitating their job performance. By contrast, officers who more strongly support retributive justice believe that they should maintain distance between themselves and the public (Pratto et al., 1994; Darley, 2002; Hall, Hall, and Perry, 2016). In other words, by definition, they believe in strict behavior control, which requires officers to distance themselves from the public and act in more authoritarian ways (Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock, 1999; McKee and Feather, 2008). As such, PPU does not clash with these officers’ sense of how things should be; from their perspective, these misunderstandings are mere reflections of the social distance that should exist between themselves and the public. Because image discrepancies do not clash with their worldviews, officers with more conservative ideologies should be less likely to experience uncertainty under PPU and thus should be less susceptible to exhibiting performance decrements.

Second, justice ideologies can differentially shape how officers attribute public image discrepancies. Research suggests that people with less punitive attitudes toward offenders are less likely to make internal attributions for the offenders’ behaviors, or blame the offenders’ actions on inherent, unchangeable flaws (Maruna and King, 2009). In fact, people with less punitive attitudes in general tend to make more external attributions in explaining others’ behaviors—e.g., attributions that emphasize unfair social circumstances rather than personal causes like incompetence or laziness (Kluegel, 1990; Skitka and Tetlock, 1992). People with punitive attitudes tend to do the opposite; they make internal attributions. Extrapolating from this research, officers who more strongly believe in restorative justice may be more likely to attribute blame for public image
Discrepancies to the numerous factors that fall outside of the public’s control. These external attributions and inability to precisely pinpoint the reason for the misunderstandings can further contribute to the uncertainty under PPU; it is difficult to pinpoint the exact cause of the misunderstanding. However, officers who hold more conservative ideologies are more likely to attribute the image discrepancies to the incompetence of the public—and/or their lack of motivation in trying to understand officers’ jobs. By making these attributions, these officers essentially shield themselves from the uncertainties inherent in misunderstandings. That is, in deflecting blame and placing it on the public, these officers can instead focus on their training and doing what they are tasked to do, thereby minimizing any negative effects of PPU on performance. In sum, I hypothesize the following:

**Hypothesis 2.** Officer ideologies moderate the relationship between perceived public underestimation of their jobs (“PPU”) and performance. The relationship is negative when officers are more liberal (i.e., have stronger beliefs in restorative justice); however, this negative effect is reduced when officers are more conservative (i.e., have stronger beliefs in retributive justice).

**The Effects of Ideologies on Perceived Public Underestimation of Employees’ Jobs**

Motivated information processing theory also posits that people selectively process their worlds in ways that confirm their prior beliefs (Festinger, 1957; Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998). That is, motivated information processing theory highlights the “robust tendency of individuals to perceive information that is consistent with a preferred judgment conclusion (preference-consistent information) as more valid than information that is inconsistent with that conclusion (preference-inconsistent information)” (Ditto and Lopez, 1992: 569). Drawing on this premise, I also hypothesize that officer ideologies may not only affect how they interpret and respond to PPU but also the likelihood that they experience these image discrepancies in the first place.

Given that officers who more strongly support restorative justice tend to advocate for more communal relationships between representatives of the justice system and transgressors (Okimoto, Wenzel, and Feather, 2012), I hypothesize that officers with these ideologies would be more motivated to seek information that the public does understand the difficulties of their jobs—and reject information that disconfirms this possibility. That is, because officers with these ideologies believe they should minimize the distance between themselves and the public, they should be motivated to downplay any differences or misunderstandings stemming from the
public, and selectively attend to information that confirms social proximity. But the opposite pattern should arise among officers who more strongly support retributive justice. Because people with conservative ideologies tend to advocate for more adversarial relationships that emphasize dominance (Sidanius et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2008), they should be more receptive of information that the public does not understand the difficulties of their jobs—and discount or devalue information that suggests otherwise. In other words, their beliefs in “us” versus “them” justice is likely to make officers attend to, and actively seek out, cues that maintain social separation between themselves and the public.

**Hypothesis 3.** Officer ideologies shape the perceived public underestimation of their jobs (“PPU”) such that officers who are more liberal (i.e., have stronger beliefs in restorative justice) are less likely to report PPU whereas officers who are more conservative (i.e., have stronger beliefs in retributive justice) are more likely to report PPU.

**Overview of Empirical Studies**

I tested my hypotheses across three empirical studies of law enforcement officers. As noted at the onset of this article, the law enforcement context was appropriate given that it is one in which the public can impose negative consequences for employees, thereby increasing the significance of PPU for employee performance. Furthermore, testing my hypotheses in the law enforcement context was also practically important, given both the susceptibilities of police officers to experiencing PPU and the significant impact that officer behaviors can have on human life.

Studies 1 and 2 tested Hypotheses 1-3. Study 1 surveyed officers at two law enforcement agencies, both of which required personnel to wear body worn cameras (video and audio recording devices that are affixed to their uniforms). These devices provided me access to body camera footage for each officer, which was coded on a performance measure by independent expert raters (retired Division Commanders). Study 2 replicated Study 1 using another source for officer performance: supervisor ratings. Study 3 re-tested Hypothesis 3, the relationship between officer ideology and role-based image discrepancies, by temporally separating the variables in order to reduce common source response bias.

**Study 1 Method**

**Participants and Procedure**
I surveyed officers at two law enforcement agencies in the U.S. that had implemented body worn cameras and thus stored video footage. These officers received a survey that measured the degree to which they believed the public underestimates the difficulties of their jobs, and the degree to which they believed in restorative versus retributive justice. The overall response rate across the two agencies was 164/273 (60%). Broken down, the response rate for the first agency was 94/147 (64%), and for the second, 70/126 (56%). The sample primarily consisted of White/Caucasian (87%), male (86%) officers at the rank of officer/deputy (the lowest rank) (73%). The average tenure in the organization was 9.34 years. All officers received $10 Amazon e-gift cards in exchange for their participation.

After receiving approval from their respective legal departments, the agencies electronically sent me five randomly selected body camera videos for each of the officers who completed the survey. I was allowed access to this footage under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). However, in accordance with state/agency policies regarding ongoing investigations, I was only allowed access to footage of “non-events” (footage in which lethal force was not used and for which there were no pending trials or internal affairs investigations). Of these non-events, the agency randomly selected five videos for each officer (a total of 820 videos across both agencies). The types of events captured were typical of what officers do on a daily basis, and included, for example, jail transports, traffic/DUI stops, transient arrests, vehicular crashes, building searches, and house alarm calls. The videos ranged from approximately 2 to 75 minutes in length.

To obtain independent ratings of officer performance in these videos, two individuals were recruited from an association of retired officers in a different city from the ones where the agencies were located. Both individuals retired at the rank of Division Commander (the rank immediately below Assistant Chief) and were selected based on their extensive experience in law enforcement. Together, they had over 50 years of law enforcement experience, which included lengthy tenures on patrol at the start of their careers. Additionally, both individuals had overseen the internal affairs department during their tenure, for which they reviewed in-car video footage to investigate complaints and use of force incidents. Thus, they were experienced in identifying and evaluating problematic officer behaviors. The coders were asked to rate officer performance in all 820 videos in
exchange for $5,000. Before being distributed to the coders, all videos were put in randomized order and stripped of any identifying officer information (i.e., video titles were replaced with unique numbers).

Training occurred during the first month of the project, when raters worked through three batches of 30 videos each. After each batch, disagreements in ratings were resolved through discussion between the raters, which primarily involved specifying the standards used to assess the officer behaviors. After these three rounds, the raters independently coded the remaining videos. While coding the videos, both raters identified 13 videos in each agency (a total of 26) that could not be rated because there was no substantial officer action (e.g., the officer was simply transporting or booking an individual with whom there was little interaction or audio/visual quality was very poor). Deletion of these videos resulted in a total of 794 videos that could be rated (each officer was linked to at least 3 videos).

**Measures**

All measures were on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*), unless otherwise indicated.

**Officers’ perceptions that the public underestimates their jobs**

Because no established scale to measure the construct existed, I used the qualitative data from Vough et al. (2013) to guide development of survey items. I first developed five survey items to measure officers’ beliefs that the public underestimates the difficulties of their jobs (PPU). I ran a pretest of the convergent and discriminant validity of the scale among 200 individuals employed in the U.S. who were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (see Appendix). A principle components analysis with varimax rotation revealed that three of the five items loaded onto a single factor and had an acceptable internal reliability, $\alpha = .84$. In a series of confirmative factor analyses, these three PPU items were further compared to character-based image discrepancies (with respect to competence, warmth, and trustworthiness) (Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick, 2007) and organization-based image discrepancies (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). As indicated by the model comparisons in the Appendix, analyses revealed strong convergent and discriminant validity for the scale. With respect to convergent validity, a maximum likelihood analysis revealed that the three PPU items loaded onto a distinct factor compared to the items for competence, warmth, and trustworthiness. With respect to divergent validity, analyses revealed that the 3-factor models comparing PPU, one of the character-based image discrepancies, and
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organization-based image discrepancies were superior to the 2-factor and 1-factor models (i.e., all CFIs > .95, Ryu, 2014). Results for the 3-factor models were as follows: (a) PPU, competence, organization ($CFI = .98$, $RMSEA = .05$, $χ^2 = 76.66$, $d.f. = 51$); (b) PPU, warmth, organization ($CFI = .98$, $RMSEA = .07$, $χ^2 = 77.35$, $d.f. = 41$); and (c) PPU, trustworthiness, organization ($CFI = .97$, $RMSEA = .07$, $χ^2 = 123.51$, $d.f. = 62$).

Consequently, the three items were adapted for the law enforcement context. Beginning with the stem, “In this country, the general public…” officers indicated their agreement with the items: (a) is knowledgeable about what it takes to be a law enforcement officer; (b) is aware of the difficulties and challenges of our jobs; and (c) can picture the dilemmas I confront on a day-to-day basis ($α = .91$). I reverse-coded these items so higher numbers reflected stronger perceptions that the public underestimated the difficulties of their jobs (i.e., higher PPU).

**Officers’ political ideologies**

I adapted items from Carroll et al. (1987) to measure officers’ relative support of restorative versus retributive justice. Consistent with theorizing on justice ideologies (e.g., Wenzel et al., 2008), I included items that involved both dealing with current offenders and deterring future offenders. There were a total of five items that, consistent with how ideological positions are typically measured (e.g., Chambers, Schlenker, and Collisson, 2013; Tetlock et al., 2013)$^1$, were rated on a bipolar 7-point scale anchored at “1” by a principle consistent with more liberal restorative beliefs and at “7” with a principle consistent with more conservative retributive beliefs. Beginning with the stem, “In my opinion, more efforts should be placed on…” the items were: (a) Making corrective procedures more “rehabilitative”—Making correctional procedures more “punitive”; (b) Rehabilitating criminals so they can be productive members of society—Keeping criminals behind bars; (c)

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$^1$ More specifically, past researchers have typically measured people’s political ideologies using a single, bipolar liberalism-conservatism scale item, which has found to be theoretically and empirically valid across a number of studies (see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, for a review). As Jost et al. (2009: 312) note, scholars typically rely on this measure because “[unipolar] measures of liberalism and conservatism are seldom if ever truly uncorrelated” (see also Napier & Jost, 2008 and Benoit & Laver, 2006). To examine if this assumption of correlation also held for my measure of criminal justice ideologies, I ran a test using 202 individuals in the U.S. recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Respondents were given two separate unipolar measures, one reflecting weak to strong beliefs in retributive justice, and the other, weak to strong beliefs in restorative justice, and asked to indicate their beliefs on a 7-point Likert scale. As expected, the measures were negatively correlated at -.45 ($p < .001$), which was even higher than the -.20 correlation that is typically found with unipolar measures of general liberalism and conservatism (Kerlinger, 1984).
Working with the community to decrease the prevalence of repeat offenders—Adopting a ‘get tough’ attitude toward repeat offenders; (d) Creating more community support programs—Creating tougher laws against crime; and (e) Squashing the fundamental problems that lead to crime (e.g., poverty, lack of family structure)—Squashing criminals to set an example for others ($\alpha = .84$).

**Officer performance ratings**

Job performance refers to the “effectiveness of individual behaviors that contribute to organizational objectives” (Grant, 2008: 109). To this end, I worked with the expert raters to develop a performance measure that was (a) relevant in capturing what it means for a law enforcement officer to exhibit effective behaviors on patrol, and (b) practical in terms of differentiating officer behaviors in the video footage. The final items were loosely adapted from Griffin, Neal, and Parker (2007) to fit the law enforcement context: “This officer…” (a) overall, performed his/her law enforcement duties well; (b) performed his/her on-scene functional duties in a competent manner; and (c) followed tactical best practices for law enforcement officer safety ($\alpha = .71$).

The raters were instructed to ensure that they rated the behaviors of the officer wearing the body cameras (i.e., not the behaviors of the other officers who may have been captured in the footage). Following the guidelines prescribed by Shrout and Fleiss (1979), because the same raters rated the same videos (i.e., there was a fixed set of judges), I calculated a two-way mixed ICC (3), which was .67. According to LeBreton and Senter (2008), this ICC constitutes moderate to strong agreement between the raters. Thus, ratings for each body camera video were averaged across the two raters, and the average across the videos for each officer was calculated.

In addition to providing their ratings, the coders were given the option of providing informal comments (this was not mandated). Examples of comments for low ratings of performance included, “Officer appeared to be carrying a long rifle, very poor tactic if he is also handling people, which he did”; “Poor tactic cuffing while

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2 The raters were also asked to complete the 5-item criminal justice ideology scale to gauge their own beliefs. On this 7-point scale, Rater 1 had a mean score of 2.6 (SD = .89) and Rater 2 had a mean score of 2.2 (SD = 1.30). Averaged together, the raters leaned liberal ($M = 2.4, SD = .28$). Results reported in the next section show that there was no main effect of officer ideology on expert ratings of performance, indicating that conservative officers were not systematically being rated lower by the more liberal raters. In Study 2, the replication study, supervisor ideologies were included as control variables.

3 Results do not differ if the ratings are aggregated or separated. For ease of reporting, results are reported as an aggregate measure.
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there was a straight knife on his belt in the small of his back”; and “They tell him he can go then they ask if they can search him, that’s wrong.” An example of a comment for a high rating was, “Great traffic stop with older female who passed on median and ran red light.”

Control variables

Because it is one of the strongest predictors of job performance (e.g., Judge et al., 2001), I controlled for job satisfaction, which was measured using a three-item scale from Withey and Cooper (1989). A sample item is, “All in all, I like working in this job” (α = .88). Additionally, I controlled for officers’ agency, rank, race, and organizational tenure. I created two dummy variables for agency (Agency1 where “1” = Agency1 and “0” = Agency2 and Agency2 where “1” = Agency2 and “0” = Agency1), rank (Rank_Officer where “1” = Deputy/Officer and “0” = “Other” and Rank_Other where “1” = above deputy/officer and “0” = Deputy/Officer), and race (Race_White where “1” = White/Caucasian and “0” = Other and Race_Other where “1” = non-White/Caucasian and “0” = White/Caucasian). Organizational tenure was reported in years. Results are reported without and with these controls.

Study 1 Results
Means, standard deviations, and correlations of all variables are reported in Table 1.

Table 1: Study 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>5.86</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>2. Criminal justice ideologies</td>
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<td>.24**</td>
<td>[.84]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>3. Officer performance</td>
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<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.02</td>
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<td>5. Agency1</td>
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<td>.50</td>
<td>.16*</td>
<td>.26**</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td>.19*</td>
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<td>6. Rank_Officer</td>
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<td>.09</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.37***</td>
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</tr>
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<td>7. Race_White</td>
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<td>.34</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. OrgTenure
9.34  7.33  -.05  -.08  -.07  -.06  -.19*  -.12  --  .54***  --

Notes. n = 164; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (2-tailed). Excluded Agency2, Rank_Other, Race_Other. Alpha reliability scores are in brackets.

Hypothesis 1 stated that PPU would be negatively related to job performance. To test this hypothesis, I regressed the performance measure on PPU. Results showed that there was no significant main effect of PPU on performance without ($\beta = .01, SE = .01, t = -.68, n.s.$) and with controls ($\beta = -.01, SE = .01, t = -.61, n.s.$). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.

Hypothesis 2 stated that PPU would interact with officer justice ideologies to shape their performance, such that those with more liberal criminal justice beliefs would exhibit performance decrements under PPU, but those with more conservative beliefs would be shielded from these decrements. To test this hypothesized interaction, I used the PROCESS Model 1 algorithm with mean-centered variables from Hayes (2013). Results in Tables 2a and 2b indicate a significant interaction effect on officer performance ratings without ($\beta = .03, SE = .01, t = 2.80, p < .01$) and with controls ($\beta = .02, SE = .01, t = 2.58, p = .01$), respectively.
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Table 2a: Study 1 Interactive Effects of Perceived Public Underestimation of Job and Officer Justice Ideologies on Job Performance (without Controls)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived public underestimation of job (PPU)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice ideologies</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived public underestimation of job x criminal justice ideologies</td>
<td><strong>.03</strong></td>
<td>.01</td>
<td><strong>2.80</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. n = 164; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Output from PROCESS Model 1; Bolded statistics show test of hypothesis.

Table 2b: Study 1 Interactive Effects of Perceived Public Underestimation of Job and Officer Justice Ideologies on Job Performance (with Controls)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
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</thead>
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<td>.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agency1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rank_Officer</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race_White</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgTenure</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived public underestimation of job (PPU)</td>
<td>-.00</td>
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<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice ideologies</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived public underestimation of job x criminal justice ideologies</td>
<td><strong>.02</strong></td>
<td>.01</td>
<td><strong>2.58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. n = 164; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Output from PROCESS Model 1; Bolded statistics show test of hypothesis.

To interpret the nature of the interaction, I plotted simple slopes (Aiken and West, 1991). As can be seen in Figure 1 (left panel; without controls), PPU was negatively related to performance when officers more strongly supported liberal justice ideologies (-1 SD) (simple effect = -.04, $SE = .02$, $t = -2.17$, $p < .05$), but not when officers more strongly supported conservative justice ideologies (+1 SD) (simple effect = .03, $SE = .02$, $t = 1.67$, n.s.). A similar pattern emerged when simple slopes were plotted with controls (right panel). Hypothesis 2 was thus fully supported.
Finally, Hypothesis 3 stated that officer ideologies would directly affect perceptions of public underestimation. OLS regression analysis revealed that stronger conservative justice beliefs were positively related to PPU without controls ($\beta = .23$, $SE = .07$, $t = 3.13$, $p < .01$) and with controls ($\beta = .20$, $SE = .08$, $t = 2.61$, $p = .01$). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was also fully supported.

**Study 1 Discussion**

Utilizing a unique dataset, independent expert ratings of the body camera footage of police officers, this study revealed at least three important findings. First, in contrast to previous suggestions in the qualitative work of Vough et al. (2013), Study 1 revealed that PPU is not necessarily negatively related to job performance. This finding implies that although the types of employees interviewed by Vough and colleagues may be similar to law enforcement officers in the sense that failure to meet public expectations can be consequential, there may be other nuanced differences among these occupations that affect the degree to which PPU has main effects on performance. I elaborate on this point in the Theoretical Contributions section. Second, Study 1 is the first to shed light on the power of political ideologies in shaping how employees react to public image discrepancies.
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Only officers with stronger liberal ideologies were negatively affected by PPU; officers with stronger conservative ideologies were not. Put another way, officers who believe in maintaining communal relationships and shared identities with the public are more negatively affected by PPU than those who believe in maintaining a more punitive, distant relationship. Third, in addition to providing valuable insights into the boundary conditions of the PPU-performance link, Study 1 provided further insights into the power of ideologies in shaping perceptions of image misalignments. While stronger support for conservative justice policies protect officers from experiencing lower performance, they augment perceptions of image misalignments in the first place.

Although Study 1 provided initial evidence for the critical role that political ideologies can play in shaping both the consequences and antecedents of PPU, I sought to replicate these findings in order to increase their robustness. In particular, because Study 1 utilized external ratings of officer performance (i.e., ratings from people outside of the agency), I tested Hypotheses 1-3 in Study 2 using another source of performance ratings: internal supervisors.

**Study 2 Method**

**Participants and Procedure**

In Study 2, I surveyed officers at four small law enforcement agencies in the U.S. Similar to Study 1, at Time 1, officers received a survey that measured the degree to which they believed the public underestimated the difficulties of their jobs, and the degree to which they supported liberal justice policies relative to conservative justice policies. The overall response rate across the four agencies was 82/90 (91%). Broken down, the response rate for the agencies was 37/40 (93%) for the first; 9/11 (82%) for the second; 14/14 (100%) for the third; and 22/25 for the fourth (88%). The sample primarily consisted of White/Caucasian (70%), male (81%) officers at the rank of officer/deputy (the lowest rank) (69%). The average tenure in their respective organizations was 9.82 years. At Time 2, six months later, each of the officers’ supervisors rated their overall performance (a total of 16 distinct supervisors). I received supervisor ratings for all officers (a 100% response rate).

**Measures**
All measures were on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), unless otherwise indicated.

**Officers’ perceptions that the public underestimates their jobs**

At Time 1, I used the same 3-item scale from Study 1 to measure officers’ perceptions that the public underestimates their jobs (i.e., PPU) ($\alpha = .92$). Items were reverse-coded so higher numbers reflected stronger perceptions that the public underestimated the difficulties of their jobs (i.e., higher perceived image discrepancies).

**Officers’ political ideologies**

At Time 1, I used the same bipolar 5-item scale from Study 1 to measure officers’ ideologies ($\alpha = .84$). Higher numbers reflected stronger beliefs in conservative justice ideologies, i.e., beliefs in retributive justice.

**Officers’ overall job performance**

At Time 2, I used the scale from Ashford and Black (1996) to measure officers’ overall job performance. This measure captured a broad array of behaviors that typically help organizations achieve their objectives. Using a percentile scale ranging from “bottom 10%” to “top 10%,” supervisors rated each officer on: (a) overall performance; (b) ability to complete tasks on time; (c) quality of performance; (d) achievement of work goals; and (e) ability to get along with others ($\alpha = .92$).

**Control variables**

Similar to Study 1, I controlled for officers’ job satisfaction using the same three-item scale ($\alpha = .90$). Additionally, I controlled for officers’ agency, rank, race, and organizational tenure. I created four dummy variables for agency (Agency1 where “1” = Agency1 and “0” = Other, Agency2 where “1” = Agency2 and “0” = Other, Agency3 where “1” = Agency3 and “0” = Other, and Agency4 where “1” = Agency4 and “0” = Other). Two dummy variables were created for rank (Rank_Officer where “1” = Deputy/Officer and “0” = “Other” and Rank_Other where “1” = above deputy/officer and “0” = Deputy/Officer) and race (Race_White where “1” = White/Caucasian and “0” = Other and Race_Other where “1” = non-White/Caucasian and “0” = White/Caucasian). Organizational tenure was reported in years.

Finally, because supervisors’ ideologies could influence how they rate officers with certain ideologies (Chambers, Schlenker, and Collisson, 2013), I asked supervisors to complete the 5-item justice ideology scale,
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and included these scores as a control variable. The supervisors in this sample were, on average, more moderate in their criminal justice beliefs (M = 4.07, SD = 1.56) than were the raters in Study 1 (M = 2.4, SD = .28).

Results are reported without and with these controls.

**Study 2 Results**

Means, standard deviations, and correlations of all variables are reported in Table 3.

**Table 3: Study 2 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Perceived public underestimation of job (PPU) (T1)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>[ .92]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Criminal justice ideologies (T1)</td>
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<td>.10</td>
<td>[ .84]</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Officer performance (T2)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>[ .92]</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Job satisfaction (T1)</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
<td>[ .90]</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.24</td>
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<td>.03</td>
<td>.35*</td>
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<td>6. Agency2 (T1)</td>
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<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.13</td>
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<td>.32**</td>
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<td>7. Agency3 (T1)</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<td>.41**</td>
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<td>8. Rank_Officer (T1)</td>
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<td>.36*</td>
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<td>OrgTenure (T1)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supervisor criminal justice ideology (T2)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>7</td>
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</table>

Notes. N = 82; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (2-tailed). Excluded Agency4, Rank_Other, Race_Other. Alpha reliability scores are in brackets. T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2 (T1 + 6 months).

Because the officers were nested within supervisors, who were nested within agencies, I first tested the non-independence of the data. A null random coefficient model with no predictors revealed that 33% of the variance in overall performance resided between supervisors (ICC[1] = .33, p = .05) and less than 1% resided between agencies (ICC[1] = .00, n.s.). Given the non-independence of the data (with respect to supervisors), I proceeded to use multilevel modeling to account for the nested nature of the data.

To recap, Hypothesis 1 predicted a main effect of PPU on officer performance. The main effect was insignificant without ($t(66) = -1.17, n.s.$) and with controls ($t(63) = -.55, n.s.$). Replicating Study 1, Hypothesis 1 was again not supported. Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be a significant interactive effect of PPU and officer ideologies on performance. The predictor variables were mean-centered. As can be seen in Tables 4a and 4b, there was a significant interaction without ($t(55) = 3.63, p = .001$) and with controls ($t(53) = 3.05, p < .01$), respectively.
Table 4a: Study 2 Interactive Effects of Perceived Public Underestimation of Job and Officer Justice Ideologies on Job Performance (without Controls)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Supervisor Ratings of Officer Performance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived public underestimation of job (PPU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminal justice ideologies</td>
<td>-.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perceived public underestimation of job x criminal justice ideologies</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 4b: Study 2 Interactive Effects of Perceived Public Underestimation of Job and Officer Justice Ideologies on Job Performance (with Controls)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Supervisor Ratings of Officer Performance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rank_Officer</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race_White</td>
<td>-.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgTenure</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Supervisor) criminal justice ideologies</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived public underestimation of job (PPU)</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Officer) criminal justice ideologies</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived public underestimation of job x criminal justice ideologies</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. n = 82; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Bolded statistics show test of hypothesis.

Simple slopes plotted in Figure 2 (left panel) reveal that PPU was negatively related to performance when officers had stronger liberal justice ideologies (-1 SD) (simple effect = .34, \( SE = .13, t = -2.57, p < .05 \)), but not when they had stronger conservative ideologies (+1 SD) (simple effect = .07, \( SE = .13, t = .53, n.s. \)). Similar patterns emerged when simple slopes were plotted with controls (right panel). Hypothesis 2 was thus successfully replicated.
Figure 2: Study 2 Simple Slopes

Hypothesis 3 predicted that officer ideologies would predict PPU. OLS regression revealed that this effect was insignificant without (t(78) = .89, n.s.) and with controls (t(70) = .74, n.s.). Thus, in contrast to Study 1, Hypothesis 3 was not supported in this study.

Study 2 Discussion

Using internal supervisor ratings of officer performance, I replicated the finding that PPU does not have a significant main effect on employee performance (cf., Vough et al., 2013), providing further evidence that in certain contexts like public safety, employees may not react to PPU in systematic ways. Study 2 further finds support for the important role that employee ideologies play in driving differences in how they react to these perceived image misalignments. Again, having stronger liberal ideologies negatively impacted officers who believed that the public underestimated their job. Presumably, because their normative sense of the world is violated, these officers confront greater uncertainty under perceived image misalignments than do officers who hold stronger conservative beliefs.

In a departure from Study 1, I was not able to replicate the hypothesized relationship between officer ideologies and PPU. As indicated in Table 3, the correlation between the two variables was insignificant at .10,
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although it was positive as expected. It is possible that I did not find a significant effect due to the small sample size, i.e., there was not enough power such that the “chances of discovering effects that are genuinely true is low” (Button et al., 2013: 366). Therefore, I sought to re-test Hypothesis 3 using a larger sample of police officers. Furthermore, even though Study 1 found support for Hypothesis 3, the results may have been skewed by common source bias (i.e., inflated correlations that arise from using single sources). Thus, in addition to using a larger sample, Study 3 was designed to include a time-lag, which tends to reduce common source biases (Ostroff, Kinicki, and Clark, 2002).

**Study 3 Method**

**Participants and Procedure**

In Study 3, I surveyed officers at a law enforcement agency in the Eastern U.S. At Time 1, officers received a survey that measured the degree to which they more strongly supported liberal versus conservative justice polices. Control variables were also collected at this time. At Time 2, three months later, officers received a second survey that measured the degree to which they believed the public underestimates the difficulties of their jobs. This three month lag was chosen because it extends well beyond what it is typically required to reduce common source bias (Ostroff, Kinicki, and Clark, 2002), and data collection was needed at this time for an unrelated project. The overall response rate was 184/387 (48%). At Time 1, 262/387 responded to the survey (68%), and 184 out of these 262 officers responded to the second survey at Time 2 (70%). The sample primarily consisted of White/Caucasian (80%), male (80%) officers at the rank of officer/deputy (the lowest rank) (54%). The average organizational tenure was 10.09 years.

**Measures**

All measures were on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (**strongly disagree**) to 7 (**strongly agree**), unless otherwise indicated.

**Officers’ political ideologies**

I used the same bipolar 5-item scale from Studies 1 and 2 to measure officers’ ideologies ($\alpha = .83$). Higher numbers reflected stronger conservative ideologies (i.e., beliefs in retributive justice).

**Officers’ perceptions that the public underestimates their jobs**
I used the same 3-item scale from Studies 1 and 2 to measure PPU (α = .88). Items were reverse-coded so higher numbers reflected stronger perceptions that the public underestimated the difficulties of their jobs (i.e., higher perceived image misalignments).

**Control variables**

Similar to Studies 1 and 2, I controlled for job satisfaction (α = .86), along with officers’ rank, race, and organizational tenure, which were all dummy coded in the same ways as described above. Results are reported without and with these controls.

**Study 3 Results**

Means, standard deviations, and correlations of all variables are reported in Table 5.

**Table 5: Study 3 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Criminal justice ideology (T1)</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Perceived public underestimation of job (PPU) (T2)</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Job satisfaction (T1)</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rank_Officer (T1)</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Race_White (T1)</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. OrgTenure (T1)</td>
<td>10.09</td>
<td>7.29</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.70***</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes. N = 184; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (2-tailed). Excluded Rank_Other and Race_Other. Alpha reliability scores are in brackets. T1 = Time 1, T2 = Time 2 (T1 + 3 months).*

I ran an OLS regression with officer ideologies as the predictor variable and PPU as the outcome variable. There was a significant effect without controls ($\beta = .14, SE = .06, t = 2.34, p < .05$) and with controls ($\beta = .14, SE = .06, t = 2.24, p < .05$) (see Table 6). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was fully supported: officers with stronger conservative ideologies were more likely to believe that the public underestimated the difficulties of their jobs.
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Table 6: Study 3 Effects of Officer Ideologies on Perceived Public Underestimation of Job (with Controls)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Step 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job satisfaction</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank_Officer</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race_White</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OrgTenure</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.94</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal justice ideology</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>2.24*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. N = 184; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Bolded statistics show test of hypothesis.

Study 3 Discussion

Using a time-lagged survey design, I found that officers’ ideologies did shape the degree to which they perceive image misalignments with the public. Thus, Study 3 replicated Study 1 in finding an effect but also contradicted the findings of Study 2 in which there was no effect. I explore possible reasons why these conflicting findings may be the case across the three studies in the Theoretical Contributions section.

The overall results across the three studies shed important insights into the interplay of image discrepancies and belief systems. Liberal ideologies are negatively related to perceived public image discrepancies, but once they are experienced by liberals, they are detrimental to employee performance. Conversely, conservative ideologies buffer against the harmful effects of perceived image discrepancies on performance, but they also augment the experience of these image discrepancies. Taken together, these studies suggest that, over time, image discrepancies and ideologies can interact in ways that sustain and exacerbate divides between employees and the public—a proposition that has important theoretical and practical implications.

Theoretical Contributions

For one, these studies suggest that the relationship between role-based image discrepancies and individual performance may not be as straightforward as has been previously assumed. Contrary to previous research, Studies 1 and 2 did not find a main effect between PPU and performance, which suggests that there
may be systematic differences in how people respond to perceived divergences in their public image (cf., Vough et al., 2013). One possible reason that previous research found main effects between PPU and performance, in contrast to the studies here, may be that there are nuanced differences in the law enforcement context compared to the occupational contexts studied by Vough et al. (2013). Although in all the occupations studied across these two articles (law enforcement, architecture, nursing, law, and accounting), the public has the power to impose negative consequences on employees for failing to meet expectations, these negative consequences are particularly high in the law enforcement context because human lives are at stake in every officer-public interaction. As such, because there are significant consequences for failing to perform effectively, I may have not observed a main negative effect of PPU on performance. In other words, the nature of the job may have “capped” the degree to which officers could allow public perceptions to affect their behaviors. Furthermore, such contexts like law enforcement, in which the consequences of error are substantial, typically provide standard practices for their employees in order to guide their behaviors in uncertain and demanding environments (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 1999). As such, unlike the contexts in which Vough and colleagues (2013) conducted their study, the law enforcement context may inherently provide more guidance for employees to cope with the uncertainty caused by image discrepancies, thereby tamping down the degree to which employees are, as a whole, negatively affected by PPU.

The lack of main effect between PPU and performance is not only consequential for the emerging literature on role-based image discrepancies but also for the literature on image discrepancies and self-verification in general. As noted at the onset of this article, the literature on character-based image discrepancies has also assumed that they negatively impact performance because they induce uncertainty and stress (Swann, 1983; North and Swann, 2009). As a reflection of this assumption, Cable and Kay (2012: 361), summarizing self-verification theory which examines people’s basic human need for others to perceive them accurately, states “Since self-views represent the lens through which people perceive the world and organize their behavior, it is critical that these lenses maintain some degree of integrity and stability, or people lose their means of knowing the world and predicting others’ responses.”

The studies presented in this article, however, suggest that even though image discrepancies and the inability to “self-verify” may induce uncertainty among individuals, not all react to this uncertainty in the same
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way (cf., Swann, 1983; Swann, 1987). Again, the differences here may be attributable to the different contexts in which relationships were studied. Previous work linking image discrepancies to performance has been conducted among student groups (Polzer, Milton, and Swann, 2002) or in the laboratory (Steele and Aronson, 1995; Swann et al., 2003; Croizet et al., 2004). Although there are indeed negative repercussions for performing ineffectively in these aforementioned contexts, they may not be as consequential as that experienced in the law enforcement context. As such, previous work may not have observed the same variance in reactions to PPU as was reported here with regards to law enforcement. Nevertheless, by demonstrating an exception, my studies demonstrate that the link between image discrepancies and performance is complex; the inability to self-verify and be understood is not always corrosive.

These studies not only shed light on the potential complexities of the link between image discrepancies and performance but also identify a critical driver of the systematic differences in how people respond to PPU within the same occupational context: political ideologies. Because previous work has assumed a negative relationship between image discrepancies and performance, little attention has been paid to the individual differences that can differentially affect people’s responses to the uncertainty that image misalignments can induce. These studies are the first to demonstrate that political ideologies, which capture people’s fundamental assumptions about how society should be ordered (Knight, 2006), can powerfully shape how they react to image discrepancies. Political ideologies have these effects because as fundamental belief systems about social roles, they influence how employees interpret their social worlds, and thereby motivate them to either internalize or deflect perceived public misunderstandings. Those who more strongly believe in reducing the social distance between themselves and the public (typically characteristic of liberals) presumably internalize these misunderstandings such that they are most susceptible to the negative effects of image discrepancies. By contrast, those who more strongly believe in retaining social distance between themselves and the public (typically characteristic of conservatives) deflect these misunderstandings; for more conservative leaning employees, being misunderstood is merely part of their role. In effect, they shield themselves from misunderstandings. Taken together, the integration of image discrepancies and ideologies demonstrates just how
critical employee belief systems are in shaping how people react to image misalignments—a novel insight for research on image discrepancies.

Furthermore, employee ideologies not only affect how individuals respond to image misalignments, but also the likelihood of exhibiting them in the first place. In this vein, these studies are also the first to explore the key drivers of image discrepancies. They demonstrate that employees with more conservative ideologies are more likely to believe that the public underestimates the difficulties of their jobs. On the surface, such findings may appear to be positive: the ideologies that bolster image discrepancies are the same ones that also protect employees against the downsides of such discrepancies. But one also needs to examine the broader context in which these findings arose: law enforcement. In the long run, PPU may undermine the performance of more liberal officers, causing them to voluntarily or involuntarily leave their agencies. Thus, those who remain behind are more conservative officers who perpetually believe in divides between themselves and the public. Such perceived divides can prevent constructive discussions with the public, reinforcing continued polarization between law enforcement and the people they serve (a point discussed further below). By bringing attention to these possibilities, these studies offer an important impetus to continue examining the powerful effects that image discrepancies can have on employees. Believing that the people you serve do not understand your job can be far more potent than what one might intuitively expect.

I should also note that there were inconsistencies across the three studies with regards to the relationship between political ideologies and perceived image discrepancies (Studies 1 and 3 found support for a significant link whereas Study 2 did not). As indicated above, these inconsistencies can potentially be attributed to the differences in sample sizes. Studies 1 and 3 had an N of 164 and 184, respectively, while Study 2 was significantly smaller at N = 82. Thus, Study 2 could simply not have had enough power to find effects. Alternatively, there could also be untested boundary conditions for the political ideologies-image discrepancies link. For instance, the four agencies in Study 2 were a lot smaller in size than both of the two agencies in Study 1 and the single agency in Study 3. Because smaller sized organizations tend to have stronger normative influences and homogeneity (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), the effects of political ideologies may be masked by contextual factors such that their effects are not as potent. The opposite may be true in larger organizations where individual differences are less subject to contextual influences, making them more predictive of individual
attitudes. Nevertheless, Studies 1 and 3, given their sample sizes, offer strong initial support for the positive effects of conservative ideologies on public image discrepancies.

In addition to contributing to the image discrepancies literature, these studies contribute to the growing literature on the role of political ideologies in organizational life. Research on how political ideologies can powerfully shape non-political organizational outcomes has been gaining momentum in recent times (e.g., Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino, 2013; Tetlock et al., 2013; Briscoe, Chin, and Hambrick, 2014; Gupta and Wowak, 2016). As an example, Briscoe and Joshi (2016) found that the political ideologies of supervisors can shape gender pay disparities in organizations. While this ongoing work demonstrates how political ideologies can impact organizational outcomes, these studies were the first to examine how ideologies can affect how they perceive and relate to the people whom they serve. Although scholars have acknowledged that employees can vary in the degree to which they are socially distant or proximate to clients (Kadushin, 1962; Gittell and Douglass, 2012), little work has investigated ways to conceptualize and capture these differences. These studies correct for this by drawing attention to the usefulness of the construct of political ideologies in capturing employees’ normative beliefs about their relationships with the public, and perhaps even more importantly, demonstrating how such ideologies can ultimately affect employee effectiveness.

Furthermore, much of the work on political ideologies to date has focused on the ideologies of upper-level managers, boards, and CEOs. My studies offer an important contribution by demonstrating the power of political ideologies in shaping how lower-level employees respond to the public, and ultimately perform on the job. The effects of political ideologies on the job performance of lower level employees are particularly important given the context in which they were studied—one in which the safety of the service providers and of those whom they serve are often at risk. But, perhaps even more importantly, the study of the political ideologies of lower level employees provided insights into the paradoxical effects of these belief systems on employee outcomes. In this paper, conservative ideologies were beneficial in that they prevented PPU from undermining performance, but they were also detrimental in that they bolstered the perceptions of public misunderstandings. Liberal ideologies functioned in the opposite way: they made employees more susceptible to the undermining effects of PPU, but they simultaneously demotivated employees from perceiving discrepancies. Given these
complex effects that political ideologies can have in organizations, it is my hope that these studies motivate future scholars to continue to examine (a) how ideologies can shape important outcomes at all levels of the organizational hierarchy, including those at the lower rungs, and (b) the double-edged effects that political ideologies can potentially have at these different hierarchal levels.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

Although these studies make the aforementioned contributions, they are not without their limitations. First, the lack of main effect between image discrepancies and performance does make important theoretical advancements by shedding light on the complexities of the relationship, but it does not resolve why this finding conflicts with those found in the grounded theorizing of Vough et al. (2013). Thus, future research would benefit greatly by examining whether these conflicting findings can indeed be attributed to differences in the degree to which employees face negative repercussions for failing to meet expectations; the negative repercussions for police officers are significant compared to other professionals who interact with the public on a daily basis but do not necessarily confront such high stakes. Along similar lines, future research may also examine whether PPU does not necessarily impact performance in contexts in which standard practices are codified, and employees can rely on such practices to reduce task uncertainty (March and Simon, 1958; Sutcliffe and McNamara, 2001). In all future streams, it would also be beneficial to examine the degree to which role-based image discrepancies like PPU predict performance above and beyond character-based image discrepancies. While Vough et al. (2013) distinguished these two types of image discrepancies, little is known about their relative effects, examination of which can further our understanding of the complex relationship between image discrepancies and performance.

I also encourage future research to examine the reasons underlying the inconsistent findings regarding the relationship between political ideologies and perceived image discrepancies—e.g., are ideologies predictive of such perceptions only in larger agencies with weaker normative influences (Studies 1 and 3)? Or, was the lack of effect between political ideologies and image discrepancies simply a function of smaller sample size? Furthermore, there is interesting future work to be done regarding the measurement of political ideologies. While the bipolar scale I used to capture officers’ relative support for criminal justice policies was consistent with robust empirical work on political ideologies (e.g., Jost, Federico, and Napier, 2009), a bipolar scale does
not enable researchers to capture individuals who have strong beliefs in both sets of beliefs, i.e., officers who believe in being punitive towards transgressors (consistent with conservative ideologies) but also working with local communities through open dialogue and negotiation in order to deter future crime (consistent with liberal ideologies). Given that there was no main effect of political ideologies on performance in Studies 1 and 2, having some semblance of both ideologies may be important for police work and other public safety jobs. Future research should examine this possibility, along with how measuring high on both extremes can interact with perceptions of the public to shape performance. Doing so can provide further insights into the interplay between image discrepancies and belief systems.

Moreover, although political ideologies had powerful effects in shaping how employees respond to image discrepancies, they constitute only one characteristic that may do so. Future research would benefit from examining how contextual factors may also affect how employees respond to image discrepancies. For example, it was proposed above that the existence of standard practices may be one reason why there was a limit to the degree to which PPU directly impacted performance. Along these lines, employees who perceive public image discrepancies may perform better when they believe they have sufficient standard protocols to follow, but worse when they do not. Given that image discrepancies can lead employees to believe that there is a greater threat of being accused of negligence because the public underestimates their jobs, standard protocols can help shift blame for incidents away from employees under uncertainty. When accused of negligence or misconduct, employees can claim that they did all they could within organizational imperatives (Feldman and March, 1981; Sutcliffe and McNamara, 2001; Patil and Tetlock, 2014). Thus, those who believe standard practices are sufficient may perform better under the uncertainty-induced effects of PPU compared to those who believe standard practices to be insufficient.

Furthermore, I encourage future scholars to examine how different manifestations of political ideologies across various domains may interact with PPU to shape performance. In this article, I measured political ideologies via officers’ support of criminal justice policies, which was relevant to the law enforcement context, but may of course not be as relevant in other contexts. As such, future research can, for example, examine whether the degree to which bankers support free markets interacts with their beliefs about public perceptions of
their profession, to drive performance. Extrapolating from the findings reported in this article, bankers who are stronger supporters of unregulated markets (i.e., are more conservative) may be less susceptible to the negative effects of public image discrepancies than those who more strongly support regulated markets (i.e., are more liberal), again, because of the social distance that conservative ideology purports. As another example, among public school teachers, their beliefs about social issues (e.g., protection of minority rights) may determine how they also respond to image discrepancies. It is likely that more liberal teachers would be more negatively affected when they believe the public underestimates their jobs than do more conservative teachers who are already supportive of keeping an authoritarian distance between themselves and the public.

Lastly, but importantly, I encourage future scholars to examine the possible long-term effects of these findings. As briefly mentioned above, because image discrepancies negatively affect officers with stronger liberal beliefs, it is possible that officers with these ideologies either voluntarily or involuntarily leave their agencies, leaving behind officers with stronger conservative beliefs. Future research would thus benefit from examining (a) whether there are indeed higher turnover rates among liberal officers who face image discrepancies, and (b) how this turnover affects public trust in law enforcement. Because conservative officers reinforce perceptual divides with the public, when aggregated to the agency level, entire organizations may collectively behave in ways that retain this distance from those they serve. Such distance may not (or may) increase public trust in law enforcement. This remains an open empirical question that can be examined at many levels of analysis, including at agency and city levels.

**Practical Implications**

These findings also offer important implications for public policy. Of note, they highlight the need to pay attention to the effects of public image discrepancies among employees. Although the research presented here suggests that some employees are not affected by these image discrepancies, it does also suggest that it is the employees who believe in having more communal relationships with the public who are most negatively affected by these image discrepancies. Organizations that serve the public, and the public themselves, may thus benefit from generating creative ways to reduce employee perceptions that the public does not understand the difficulties and challenges of their jobs. For example, in the context of law enforcement, it may be beneficial to prevent heightened scrutiny from translating into officer perceptions that the public devalues officers’ roles. This
may be achieved through more careful public discourse that balances criticism with understand and appreciation for the hardships of certain professions. Furthermore, given that more liberal ideologies are related to weaker perceptions that the public underestimates employee jobs, organizations that foster norms that emphasize reducing the distance between employees and the public may attenuate the overall experience of PPU. Finally, these findings draw practitioners’ attention to the pros and cons of varying ideological belief systems. Stronger conservative ideologies can prevent performance decrements when perceptions of public underestimation runs high, but such benefits need to be weighed against the risks of continuing to bolster these perceptions of public misunderstanding. In the long run, these continued perceptual divides between employees and the public can reinforce a relationship of mistrust between the two parties, a never-ending situation that continues to plague some occupations like law enforcement.

**Conclusion**

In some occupations like law enforcement, the relationship between employees and the public has and continues to be tenuous, and be riddled with perceptions that the public devalues and dismisses employees’ jobs. While not all employees will be less effective in their jobs as a result of these perceptions, ironically, those who desire to close the distance between themselves and the public are the ones who are likely to be less effective. Given the impact that public safety organizations can have on human life, it is important that employees do not feel that the public, the people whom they serve and protect, underestimate their jobs. Otherwise, we may continue to witness further divides between us and our protectors.
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Wenzel, M., T. G. Okimoto, N. T. Feather, and M. J. Platow


Westen, D.


Withey, M. J. and W. H. Cooper

APPENDIX
Internal Reliability and Discriminant Validity for Perceived Public Underestimation of Employee Roles Scale (PPU)

We pre-tested our role-based image discrepancies items (i.e., perceived public underestimation of employee roles) to demonstrate internal reliability and discriminant validity. The pre-test consisted of 200 individuals recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk who were employed across a range of industries that serve the public, including clients, customers, students, and patients, on a day-to-day basis. The largest industries represented were management of companies or enterprises (19%), finance or insurance (11%), and professional, scientific, or technical services (10%).

Participants rated the following items for perceived public underestimation of employee roles (denoted below as “role-based image discrepancies”). As indicated in the manuscript, these items were generated from data collected by Vough, Cardador, Bednar, Dane, and Pratt (2013).

*My clients...*
- Are knowledgeable about what it takes to be a member of my profession/field of work
- Are aware of the difficulties and challenges of my job
- Can picture the dilemmas I confront on a day-to-day basis
- Underestimate how hard my work is (*reverse-coded*)
- Perceive that my profession/field of work consists of only the most visible responsibilities and tasks (*reverse-coded*)

The internal reliability of these five items was $\alpha = .69$. A principal component analysis with varimax rotation revealed that the first three items had the highest loadings (.83, .87, and .86, respectively). As such, we retained the first three items which had a much stronger reliability, $\alpha = .84$.

As a test of discriminant validity, participants also rated items pertaining to other types of image discrepancies they might have at work. We focused on the two most prominent alternative types of image discrepancies: character-based (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) and organization-based (Dukerich, Golden, & Shortell, 2002) image discrepancies. As they are typically the most studied forms of character-based image discrepancies in the literature (Vough et al., 2013), we measured character-based image discrepancies with respect to (1) competence, (2) warmth, and (3) trust.

The character-based items began with the stem, “There are differences in how my clients and I would rate the degree to which people in my profession/field of work...”. We used 5 items for competence (e.g., are competent, intelligent) ($\alpha = .85$) and 4 items for warmth (e.g., are tolerant, warm) ($\alpha = .92$) taken from Fiske et al., (2002). We used 8 items for trust taken from Hall, Camacho, Dugan, & Balkrishnan (2002) (e.g., can be trusted, can be depended on to serve clients effectively) ($\alpha = .81$). The organization-based items began with the stem, “There are differences in how my clients and I would rate the degree to which the organization I work for...”. We used 4 items taken from Dukerich et al. (2002) (e.g., Is considered to be a good organization, Is more effective than other organizations) ($\alpha = .93$).

We first ran a maximum likelihood analysis comparing role-based image discrepancies to the other types of image discrepancies. A total of 6 components were extracted. Importantly, role-based image discrepancies loaded onto a distinct component.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role-based image discrepancy item1</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role-based image</td>
<td>.89</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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| discrepancy item | .86 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Role-based image discrepancy item3 | .54 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Competence-based image discrepancy item1 | .54 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Competence-based image discrepancy item2 | .68 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Competence-based image discrepancy item3 | .83 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Competence-based image discrepancy item4 | .51 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Warmth-based image discrepancy item1 | --- | .70 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Warmth-based image discrepancy item2 | --- | .87 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Warmth-based image discrepancy item3 | --- | .80 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Warmth-based image discrepancy item4 | --- | .84 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Trust-based image discrepancy item1 | --- | --- | .70 | --- | --- | --- |
| Trust-based image discrepancy item2 | --- | --- | .73 | --- | --- | --- |
Next, we ran a series of confirmatory factor analyses. We tested three-factor combinations of role-based and organization-based image discrepancies and one of the character-based image discrepancies. For each of the three character-based image discrepancies (competence, warmth, and trust), the three-factor model was superior to the two-factor model and one-factor model (Kline, 2005):

| Trust-based image discrepancy item3 | --- | --- | --- | .75 | --- | --- |
| Trust-based image discrepancy item4 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | .81 |
| Trust-based image discrepancy item5 | --- | --- | --- | --- | .80 | --- |
| Trust-based image discrepancy item6 | --- | --- | --- | --- | .80 | --- |
| Trust-based image discrepancy item7 | --- | --- | --- | --- | .80 | --- |
| Trust-based image discrepancy item8 | --- | --- | --- | --- | .86 | --- |
| Organization-based image discrepancy item1 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | .86 |
| Organization-based image discrepancy item2 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | .84 |
| Organization-based image discrepancy item3 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | .85 |
| Organization-based image discrepancy item4 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | .85 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role, competence, and organization based image discrepancies</th>
<th>Three-Factor Model</th>
<th>Two-Factor Model</th>
<th>One-Factor Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05, ( \chi^2 = 76.66, d.f. = 51 )</td>
<td>CFI = .79, RMSEA = .17, ( \chi^2 = 362.35, d.f. = 53, \Delta\chi^2 = 142.85^{***} )</td>
<td>CFI = .62, RMSEA = .23, ( \chi^2 = 600.14, d.f. = 54, \Delta\chi^2 = 174.49^{***} )</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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| Role, warmth, and organization based image discrepancies | CFI = .98, RMSEA = .07, $\chi^2 = 77.35$, d.f. = 41 | CFI = .72, RMSEA = .23, $\chi^2 = 484.26$, d.f. = 43, $\Delta\chi^2 = 203.46^{***}$ | CFI = .58, RMSEA = .28, $\chi^2 = 721.29$, d.f. = 44, $\Delta\chi^2 = 214.65^{***}$ |
| Role, trust, and organization based image discrepancies | CFI = .97, RMSEA = .07, $\chi^2 = 123.51$, d.f. = 62 | CFI = .69, RMSEA = .21, $\chi^2 = 626.23$, d.f. = 64, $\Delta\chi^2 = 251.36^{***}$ | CFI = .56, RMSEA = .25, $\chi^2 = 867.89$, d.f. = 65, $\Delta\chi^2 = 248.13^{***}$ |